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Second Bites at the Jurisdictional Apple:
A Proposal for Preventing False
Assertions of Diversity of Citizenship
by
BRUCE

A. WAGMAN*

Federal court jurisdiction over controversies involving citizens of
different states is as old as the Constitution.1 Despite early alarms warning of its dangers and urging its abolition, 2 "diversity jurisdiction" has
survived two centuries of criticism 3 and has maintained its value to practitioners4 as an integral aspect of the adversary system in federal courts.
It may be assumed that diversity is here to stay. Any problems inherent
in applying diversity jurisdiction can and should be addressed in a functional and rational manner.
This Note does not purport to answer or contest those who would
abolish diversity jurisdiction. Nor does it suggest or endorse abandonment of the general rule allowing challenges to a court's subject matter
jurisdiction at any time.5 Rather, accepting diversity as an intrinsic part
of our judicial system, this Note proposes to eliminate one of the major
pitfalls for the practical and fair litigation of diversity cases in federal
court. Angle-conscious attorneys who purposefully delay challenging di* B.S. 1979, Cornell University School of Agriculture and Life Sciences; B.S.N. 1981,
Columbia University School of Nursing; Member, Third Year Class. The author wishes to
thank all Wagmans, especially Deborah, without whom this would not have happened.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, ci. 1.
2. "I see arising... the destruction of the state judiciaries... and, from the extensive
jurisdiction of these paramount courts, the state courts must soon be annihilated." 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 542 (1828) (statement of Patrick Henry).
3. Diversity jurisdiction in its present form is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
4. "The proposal to abolish the diversity jurisdiction is, from the standpoint of the bar,
approximately as popular as tuberculosis in a hospital. The opposition is absolutely over-

whelming." Hearings on Proposals ConcerningDiversity of Citizenship JurisdictionBefore the
Senate Subcommittee on Improvement in JudicialMachinery, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978)
[hereinafter Hearings on Diversity] (statement of John Frank).

5. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). This Note suggests modifying the rule in certain circumstances or moderating the rule by the principles of estoppel suggested in Section III. See infra
notes 177-95 and accompanying text.
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versity to thwart adverse parties are abusing Rule 12(h)(3). 6 The proposal herein attempts to thwart individuals' use of this maneuvering tool.
The proposal would result in a more just disposition of parties' legal
rights by removing the gamesmanship that the current system allows.
The present concern regarding diversity jurisdiction 7 is the rule that
subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore diversity of citizenship between
the parties, may be challenged at any time prior to final judgment. 8
Although it is well established that a federal court's jurisdiction cannot
be collaterally attacked in a subsequent action, 9 the language of Rule
60(b) arguably would allow such a challenge as well. Rule 60(b) allows a
court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment [ifl the judgment is
void." 10 Because a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is considered
void, I1 Rule 60(b) appears to apply to cases in which litigants wait until
after a final judgment has been reached, or the statute of limitations has
run, 12 to challenge subject matter jurisdiction. Despite the language of
Rule 60(b), courts consistently have prohibited such post-judgment challenges except in especially spurious circumstances, where, for example, a
court acts in a manner that amounts to a denial of due process or other
13
Constitutional rights.
The 60(b) loophole isn't the real problem: of greater concern than
these exceptions, however, is the general rule that allows and upholds
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction made before a final judgment is
rendered or after a final judgment on direct attack. No exception is made
for challenges shrewdly crafted to controvert the judicial resolution of
disputes otherwise properly before the courts. This judicially-created
rule, faultily interpreted as a constitutional and statutory mandate, has
protected diversity contests and promoted intolerable perversions of the
6.

FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) states: "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or

otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action." For the purposes of this Note, this will be designated as the "whenever rule."
7. See, e.g., R. MARCUS, M. REDISH & E. SHERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN
APPROACH 724 (1989).
8. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Capron
v. van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804); Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449, 454 (7th Cir.
1940), cert. dismissed, 312 U.S. 710 (1941); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
9. See 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.25[2] (1987) (jurisdictional defect subject to collateral attack only when the court "plainly usurped" its power and not when
the court had the general power to hear the type of suit in question).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(4).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65, 69 (1982).
12. The potential for abuse presents itself for both sides in a case. Just as a defendant
may wait for the statute to run on a plaintiff's claim before challenging jurisdiction, a plaintiff
also might wait for the statute to run on a defendant's counterclaim before challenging jurisdiction. In both situations the end result is a complainant without a forum in which to bring

her claim.
13.

See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 9,

60.25[2].
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legal system. 14 The unbreachable protection afforded to jurisdiction allows a party who is aware that there is no diversity between litigants to
delay diversity challenges until it appears that the opposing party may
15
prevail.
This Note discusses interpretations of the constitutional language
and case law that allow for a more flexible and equitable approach to
jurisdictional challenges and presents a proposal to prevent parties from
making calculated, belated attacks on diversity jurisdiction to get a second chance at a favorable outcome. The attempt at a "second bite" at
the apple of jurisdiction 16 is an abuse of the system that often is utilized
purposefully in an underhanded manner to manipulate litigation
outcomes.
Section I introduces diversity jurisdiction and summarizes both
sides of the battle between those who would eliminate diversity jurisdiction from the federal scheme and those who support expansion of the
right of diverse citizens to utilize the federal courts. The Section concludes by suggesting that the problems raised by diversity jurisdiction
can be remedied through an appropriate modification of the current
structure. Section II examines the quandary created by the unyielding
nature of subject matter jurisdiction and demonstrates the potential for
inequitable results. Finally, Section III proposes to alleviate the tensions
placed on the judicial system by creating a rebuttable presumption of
subject matter jurisdiction in certain limited situations, without otherwise disturbing the standard rules surrounding diversity jurisdiction. A
party who fails to make a timely attack on federal jurisdiction would be
bound by the court's judgment even though an initial and timely challenge of diversity jurisdiction would have been successful. 17 This proposal effectively would eliminate abuse, as demonstrated by application of
the proposed standard to four classic situations in which the system currently may be exploited. The Section concludes by explaining how the
proposal, seemingly contrary to common notions of federal jurisdiction,
is no more than a slight and logical extension of doctrines well established in the courts. Reference is made to three different approaches to
diversity in the courts. The first area is illustrative of the courts' abilities
14. See, eg., Wojan v. General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 1988) (five
years after litigation began, GM retracted its admission of diversity when it "discovered a

serious problem"--that its Michigan citizenship, which defeated federal jurisdiction, was absent from the complaint); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.,
108 F.R.D. 96, 97 (D.N.J. 1985) (active concealment of diversity was an "undeniable abuse of
the judicial process by the defendant and its counsel").
15. See infra notes 109-70 and accompanying text.
16. Law v. Converse, 297 F. Supp. 1036, 1037 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
17. Parties would be able to make untimely attacks on federal jurisdiction if they could
demonstrate evidence similar to that required for successful Rule 60(b) attacks on judgments.
For example, such an attack would be appropriate if newly discovered evidence demonstrated
a party's citizenship was void, rendering the parties nondiverse.
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to fashion procedural rules not mandated by Constitutional language.
The second area speaks to ways in which courts have relaxed the standards governing diversity jurisdiction to achieve equitable results. The
third area demonstrates that judges strictly adhere to a rule they do not
believe in and avoid it if possible while simultaneously deifying its existence and further carving it in ancient stone.
I.

The Basics of Diversity Jurisdiction: A First-Year Review
The limited jurisdiction of the federal courts 18 is granted by Con-

gress 19 within constitutionally prescribed boundaries. 20 Congress first
exercised this grant in the Judiciary Act of 1789,21 although historians
give no satisfactory explanation why Congress chose to act then, especially given the overwhelming opposition2 2 to diversity jurisdiction in the
federal courts and the lackadaisical support for this extension of the
grant. 23 Nevertheless, the Act provided for federal court jurisdiction
over cases involving parties of diverse citizenship, and subsequent modifications of the statute have not changed this requirement. All attempts at
abolition have failed.2 4 The most recent revision 25 of the diversity statute

by the 100th Congress in 1988 became effective in 1989. The revision
represented "[a] kind of compromise" between strict abolitionists and
supporters of diversity jurisdiction, maintaining the grant but limiting
the number of qualified cases by increasing the amount in controversy
required for federal jurisdiction to $50,000 and modifying other aspects
of the statute. 26
18. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 1; Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Co., 486 U.S.
800 (1988).
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 57.
22. The constitutional grant was a point of some controversy, strongly attacked and contested by anti-Federalists still wary of the potential for an overreaching central government. 3
J. ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 565-66 (statement of Mr. Grayson); 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION & RELATED MATTERS 2D
§ 3601, at 337-38 (1984); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 81 (1923) (diversity attacked in state ratifying conventions, First
Congress, and the press).
23. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 22, § 3601, at 337-38;
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 487 (1928) (noting "apathy of the defense" of diversity in constitutional conventions); Warren, supra note 22,
at 81-82 (diversity not considered consequential to Marshall, Madison, and Pendleton).
24. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
25. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title II, 102
Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988).
26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 comment (West Supp. 1990) (1988 Revision).
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In 1806, in Strawbridge v. Curtis,27 the Supreme Court first interpreted the 1789 Judiciary Act to require diverse citizenship of all plaintiffs and all defendants. 28 The "complete diversity rule" has become an
almost unbreachable barrier, despite criticism 29 and its sharp delimita31
tions in several important areas. 30 This barrier has been maintained
through strict construction of the statute, based partly in a presumption
for state jurisdiction in questionable cases. 32 In a limited number of situ33
ations, judges have maneuvered to avoid the strict effect of the rule.
These cases remain the exceptions, however, and in most courts the rule
still is ironclad.
Why diversity jurisdiction was first instituted has been an endless
source of disagreement.3 4 The most familiar rationale is fear of local
prejudice. 3 5 According to this theory, federal courts were created to prevent out-of-state citizens from suffering the bias of local tribunals pre27. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
28. Id.; see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) ("neither
the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction").
29. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 & n.6 (1967); Louisville C & C R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) (Strawbridgeshould not be
given an expansive reading); Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506
F.2d 757, 758 (1975) (Strawbridgeis merely a judicial construction, "not [a holding] of Constitutional dimensions"); see also Field, Proposals on FederalDiversity Jurisdiction, 17 S.C.L.
REv. 669, 675 (1965).
30. See, eg., Owen, 437 U.S. at 367 n.2, 368 n.3 (parties impleaded for indemnity do not
need to be diverse); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 386 U.S. at 530-31 (interpleader statute
(28 U.S.C. § 1335) requires minimal diversity); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 1987) (class actions), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); Harris v.
Illinois-California Express, Inc., 687 F.2d 1361, 1367 (10th Cir. 1982) (joinder of nondiverse,
nonindispensable intervenors of right does not defeat a federal court's jurisdiction); Fairview
Park Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1125 (3d Cir. 1977) (party may
maintain a cross claim against a nondiverse co-party in federal court, even after original diversity action dismissed); Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v. Burckhalter, 327 F. Supp. 648, 649
(W.D. Okla. 1971) (joinder of nondiverse, nonindispensable intervenors of right does not defeat a federal court's jurisdiction); FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)
(impleaded third-party defendants may assert cross-claim against nondiverse plaintiff); FED.
R. Civ. P. 24(a) (intervention as of right); see also Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention
Under Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J. 329, 362-63 (1969).
31. Owen, 437 U.S. at 377 (complete diversity is still a constitutional requirement; the
Court is unwilling to bend the rule in the interest of convenience).
32. City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941) (federal courts
should "scrupulously confine" their jurisdictional boundaries); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,
270 (1923); Van Horn v. Western Elec. Co., 424 F. Supp. 920, 923 (E.D. Mich. 1977). But cf
Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEx. L. REV. 1, 28
(1964) (constitutional provision should be construed more broadly than statutory).
33. See infra Parts II and III.
34. Marbury, Why Should We Limit FederalDiversity Jurisdiction?, 46 A.B.A. J. 379,
379 (1960) ("It is not easy ... to determine the historic basis of diversity jurisdiction.").
35. Other hypothesized rationales for invoking diversity jurisdiction include economic
advantage for commercial interests and avoidance of actualprejudice (as opposed to apprehen-
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sided over by locally elected judges. 36 Commentators consistently have
suggested that the prejudice was not necessarily based on citizenship, but
rather on commercial interests. 37 Federal forums provided protection to
moneyed interests, which local citizens viewed with jaundiced eyes. 38
Others have argued that the fear of high-powered, locally focused, ballotincentive for the estabbox-oriented state legislatures provided Congress'
39
lishment of a neutral federal court system.
In reality, however, there probably was no actual prejudice in 1789,
only apprehension of it. 4° Yet that potential was enough to stimulate
Congress to assure parties that their litigious relationships with citizens
of other states would be protected by the "strictest justice. ' 4 1 Chief Justice Marshall, the author of the Strawbridge opinion, also was not concerned with actual prejudice because "the constitution itself either
entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence
the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies." '42 Marshall unsions of potential prejudice). Frank, Historical Basis of the FederalJudiciarySystem, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 22-28 (1948).
36. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 359, 365 (1883) (a forum "unaffected by local
prejudices and sectional views"); Warren, supra note 22, at 83.
37. Frank, supra note 35, at 23, 26-27; Friendly, supra note 23, at 495-97.
38. Frank, supra note 35, at 26-27; Friendly, supra note 23, at 495-97.
39. Friendly, supra note 23, at 497-99. Although prejudice based on state citizenship
always may have been, and still may be, of dubious weight in upholding the diversity grant,
perhaps consideration should be given to other forms of prejudice that are based not on citizenship but on color of skin or religious or sexual preference. Hearings on Diversity, supra note
4, at 28 (statement of John Frank) ("prejudices of a local provincial sort continue"); Shapiro,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 330 (1977)
(provincial and attitudinal prejudices still may exist in local courts, although not classic "local
bias" to out-of-state citizens); accord ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

106-08 (1969) [hereinafter ALI

STUDY].

Bias against

nonresidents "is neither so potent nor so pervasive" as the racism that still plagues our nation.
Marbury, supra note 34, at 380-81. Similarity of citizenship does not prevent this bias. Unfortunately, bigotry is not confined to localized areas, and its effect cannot be remedied by a
structuring of the courts within the constitutional constraints of Article III. If any given particularized prejudice could be used as the grounds for federal court jurisdiction based on the
theory that discrimination against the litigant might be decreased at the federal level, then the
district courts would be open to any party able to show racial or other prejudice within her
community or state. This is clearly prohibited under Article III's language, see U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (federal courts have jurisdiction over controversies "between citizens of different states"), and is beyond the scope of this Note's proposal. This concept adds some
weight, however, to the belief that a person's domicile alone "too frequently bears no relation
to the probability of bias." Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute, PartI,
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968) (footnote omitted). To those who scoff at the idea of prejudice
against out-of-state citizens, it probably never did bear any such relation. See, e.g., Friendly,
supra note 23, at 510.
40. Friendly, supra note 23, at 493.
41. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 401, 410 (1856).
42. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 38, 45 (1809).
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doubtedly was referring to the allowance in the Constitution for federal
courts, and Congress' subsequent enactment of that grant, because the
Constitution instituted only the Supreme Court, leaving the creation of
lower national courts to the legislature.
Whatever the original rationale, it remains debatable today whether
there is any lingering prejudice against out-of-state citizens in state
courts. 43 Questions whether there is or ever was actual local prejudice
and why an attorney chooses a federal forum remain unanswered, 44 and
the few studies performed have yielded conflicting results. 45 With the
advent of modem technology such as the automobile and commercial
airlines, state lines have become mere formalities. There is no indication
that crossing a state border decreases one's chances of fair treatment by a
jury.4 6 The real reason to choose a federal forum may be the continued
preference for the standards of federal justice 47 and the perception by
attorneys that federal judges provide higher quality judging.4 8 Nonetheless, the debate continues: some scholars contend that local prejudice is
43. See, eg., F & L Drug Corp. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D.
Conn. 1961) (concept of hostility to nonresident defendants "is no longer valid, at least in this
district"); Butler & Eure, Diversity in the Court System: Let's Abolish It, 11 VA. B.A.J. 4, 7
(Winter 1985) ("bias is less a factor today than it has been in our history"). See generally
Frank, supra note 35; Friendly, supra note 23; Phillips & Christenson, The Historicaland
Legal Background of the Diversity Jurisdiction,46 A.B.A. J. 959, 962-63 (1960).
44. See, eg., J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND

MATERIALS 203 (3d ed. 1980) ("Statistical data on the actual existence of local prejudice
against out-of-state parties, or whether an attorney's belief in the existence of such prejudice is
a factor influencing forum choices, is sparse and inconclusive."); Friendly, supra note 23, at
509.
45. Compare Goldman & Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary
Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 98 (1980) (40% of attorneys polled in Northern
District of Illinois found fear of prejudice a consideration in forum choice) and Note, The
Choice Between State andFederalCourt in Diversity Casesin Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 178, 179
(1965) (up to 60% of Virginia lawyers claimed potential for prejudice was one reason for
choice of federal forum) with Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implicationsfor Reform, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 749, 759-60 (1980-81) (fear of bias
influenced choice of federal forum in Milwaukee and Columbia, S.C., but not in Philadelphia)
and Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA
L. REV. 933, 937-38 (1962) (only seven of 164 responses cited prejudice as a factor in forum
choice; the most important factors were geographical convenience, potential for broader discovery in federal court, perception of higher jury verdicts, "greater confidence in the independence and judicial temperament of federal jurist[s]," and docket pressures).
46. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 23, at 509 (diversity as a "theory so little founded on
realities").
47. See Bumiller, supra note 45, at 773.
48. Id. at 768.
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not a problem; 49 and others claim that local prejudice remains an important factor in federal court selection. 50
Although interstate prejudice often may be cited by supporters of
diversity, 5 t the ultimate agenda seems to rest on two factors. First, diversity apportions docket pressures between state and federal courts, 52 and
court congestion may be pivotal in forum selection. 53 Second, practicing
attorneys readily concede that diversity affords them an additional planning device in cases involving parties of diverse citizenship whose
amount in controversy meets the $50,000 minimum. 54 The choice of forum is essentially a "dispute settling service" provided by the federal government that affords an option for certain classes of litigants. 55 A
complementary role is that of diversity as a "force for progress and efficiency."' 56 "Progress" results from the additional judicial interpretation
and expertise provided by the federal courts. "Efficiency" is fostered by
the hypothetical expertise of federal judges and the expedition of litigation by virtue of the presence of an additional forum in which to file
cases. These components form the rudiments of the bar's near-unani57
mous support of diversity, despite its continued detractors.
A.

The War On Diversity

Diversity jurisdiction has been under constant attack since it was a
twinkle in the Framers' eyes. 58 "[N]o part of the Federal jurisdiction...
sustained so strong an attack from the anti-Federalists. ' 59 These early
attacks arose from the concern that the federal courts would engulf the
states. 60 Modern critics deride diversity jurisdiction as nothing more
than a tactical weapon for practitioners that lacks concomitant advan49.

E.g., Coyle, Time to Kill Diversity Jurisdiction?, NAT'L L.J., February 29, 1988, at 1,

col. 3.
50.

Dames, Diversity isfor Litigants,Not Courts or Judges, NAT'LL.J., April 4, 1988, at

12, col. 2.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Hearings on Diversity, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of John Frank).
Id.

53. See Bumiller, supra note 45, at 758-62 (docket pressures are the most critical factors
for Philadelphia and Los Angeles attorneys, but are less important to Milwaukee and Columbia, S.C., lawyers); Eichner, Diversity Jurisdiction:An Idea Whose Time Has Not Gone, 11 VA.
B.A.J. 4, 46 (Spring 1985) (lawyers should be able to choose more efficient forums); Perlstein,
Lawyers'Strategies and Diversity Jurisdiction, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 321, 332-33 (1981) (survey
found that court congestion was the only factor influencing decision to choose federal court).
54.
55.
56.

See, e.g., Hearingson Diversity, supra note 4, at 40-41 (statement of John Frank).
Id.
Id.

57. Id. at 41.
58. See 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 397; Friendly, supra note 23, at 488-89.
59. Warren, supra note 22, at 81.
60. See, e.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 542 (statement of Patrick Henry).
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tages for the administration of justice. 61 The glut of diversity cases is
often blamed for the crowded federal dockets. 62 Although there is no
dispute about the number of diversity cases filed in federal courts, 63 the
abolitionists' remedy would wreak havoc on state courts also suffering
from chronic congestion.6 4
The critics are clearly the most vocal. 65 In absolute numbers, however, both the defense and plaintiff bars show their support: the silent
majority relies on the grant every day.66 An undercurrent of pro-diversity commentators, moreover, has persisted in actively supporting the
doctrine. 67 A broad argument has been made that
no grant should be eliminated if it serves a useful purpose for the enforcement of federal rights, or for implementing the partnership of federal and state courts, or in enabling litigants to obtain justice under our
federal system. This latter purpose cannot be68overemphasized, for
"law was made for man; not man for the law."
This argument gains force as state and federal courts feel the effects of
the "litigation revolution. '69 Some commentators even have suggested
61. Hunter, FederalDiversity Jurisdiction: The Unnecessary Precaution, 46 UMKC L.
REV. 347, 351 (1978).
62. Id. at 352-53.
63. See infra note 69.
64. Hearingson Diversity, supra note 4, at 39 (statement of John Frank) ("[W]e are going
to take 30,000 cases out of what are now Federal courts and dump them on still more overloaded State courts.").
65. See, eg., Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing the "mounting mischief inflicted... by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction"); Hearings on Diversity, supra note 4, at 44-63 (testimony of
Charles Alan Wright); R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 37 ('[the] greatest contribution that Congress could make to the orderly administration of justice.., would be to abolish [diversity]"); NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME
HAS COME? xiii n.2 (1983); Friendly, supra note 23, at 510 (diversity is out of step with "na-

tionalizing forces"); Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptionsfor
Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 151, 158 (1987) (,"[d]iversity causes more trouble than it is worth,"

suggesting total abolition); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and
PotentialforFurtherReforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 964-65 (1979) ("pernicious effects of the
complete diversity rule").
66. Hearingson Diversity,supra note 4, at 40-42 (statements of Sen. DeConcini and John
Frank) (lawyers favor diversity); 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 22,

§ 3602, at 363.
67. See, e.g., Frank, For MaintainingDiversity Jurisdiction,73 YALE L.J. 7, 11-17 (1963);
Frankfurter, Distribution of JudicialPower Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 511-15 &passim (1928); Moore & Weckstein, supra note 32, at 23 (discussing
negative side effects of abolition).
68. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 32, at 27.
69. In 1941, 7286 diversity cases were filed in federal courts; 20,524 in 1956; 31,675 in
1976; and 68,224 in 1988. V. FLANGO, C. BOERSEMA & D. BURNS, How WOULD PROPOSED
CHANGES IN FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AFFECT STATE COURTS? 13-15 (1989)
(published by National Center for State Courts). The total number of civil suits filed nationally has increased proportionately. In 1976, 130,597 civil actions were filed nationwide;
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expanding diversity jurisdiction in response to the increased burden on
state courts. 70 These commentators scorn the complete diversity rule as
an "unnecessary obstruction to the full and most advantageous develop'7 1
ment of diversity jurisdiction."
An undercurrent of state judges also may favor the diversity grant
because of the increase in cases being filed. 72 State court judges probably
are happy with this system because abolition would increase the number
of cases filed in state courts. Although this consideration does not appear to have been in the minds of the Framers, diversity clearly helps
balance the adverse affects of the litigation revolution by shifting some

73
suits to federal courts.
Diversity may serve many purposes aside from eliminating the effect
of local prejudice, if it indeed exists. 74 Many consider the "competition
effect" of the dual court system an advantage as well as an internal motivator for both state and federal courts to strive toward excellence. 75 An
associated claim is that diversity promotes the free flow of ideas between
state and federal courts and provides concurrent checks and balances on
developing law. 76 This communication between federal and state courts
also leads to the creation of better procedures. 77 The supporters dismiss
the concern over the interpretation of state law by federal courts 78 as "a
zero problem,"' 79 and cite instances of state courts accepting
circuit court
80
interpretations as "good statement[s]" of state laws.
Beyond these claims supporting diversity, there is a hidden but logical and natural conclusion to be drawn from the way litigants utilize the
grant of diversity jurisdiction today 81-this aspect of subject matter jurisdiction has become a personal, adversarial tool for gain in private
suits, and nothing more. The technique of forum selection is a stratagem

138,770 in 1978; 168,789 in 1980; 206,193 in 1982; 261,485 in 1984; 254,828 in 1986; and
240,821 in 1988. Of those cases, 31,675 were diversity actions in 1976; 31,625 in 1978; 39,315
in 1980; 50,555 in 1982; 56,825 in 1984; 63,672 in 1986; and 68,224 in 1988. Although there
has been a slight drop in total filings, and thus an increased proportion of diversity cases,
diversity cases have never constituted more than 30% of civil filings. Id.
70. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 32, at 29.
71.
72.

73.

Id.
See supra note 69.

In 1988, over 68,000 diversity cases effectively were shifted from the state courts. V.
C. BOERSEMA & D. BURNS, supra note 69, at 13-15.
74. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
75. Frank, supra note 67, at 11-17.
76. Id.; see Frank, FederalDiversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. REV. 677,
682-83 (1965); Shapiro, supra note 39, at 324-25.
77. Frank, supra note 67; Frank, supra note 76, at 683.
78. Hearings on Diversity, supra note 4, at 41 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("It does
cause me trouble, quite frankly.").
79. Id. (statement of John Frank).
80. Id. at 42.
81. See infra notes 113-70 and accompanying text.
FLANGO,
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of some strength, powerful enough to obtain8 2 or prevent 83 one's presence in a given court and place the litigant in a more favorable forum.
84
The rule allowing challenge of subject matter jurisdiction at any time
may promote deceitful masquerades of the presence or absence of diversity.8 5 Litigants can assert diversity falsely to defeat the court's jurisdiction if the outcome is undesirable. 86 This manipulation of the system
achieves personal success in litigation while toying maliciously with basic
concepts of power and states' rights, on which the limited jurisdiction of
the federal courts was founded.
In light of these activities by modem-day litigants, the protection
that the anti-Federalists demanded to prevent an overarching federal system from usurping all state judicial power is a myth. Diversity jurisdiction no longer is functioning as the guardian of state sovereignty that the
Federalists intended it to be. It does not serve its originating purpose
when prejudice is not, and never has been, clearly confined within state
borders. Despite its placement in Article III of the Constitution, diversity jurisdiction has become essentially a right exercised by individuals to
protect individuals. Although in form federal diversity jurisdiction remains a limited grant of power based on notions of federalism, in substance it functions much like other private and personal rights.
B.

Demilitarizing the Diversity Zone

It seems that Patrick Henry was wrong when he envisioned the "annihilation" and "destruction" of the state courts if a federal judiciary
became part of the system.8 7 The state courts have continued to function
and prosper as a separate arm of our dual court structure. The volume of
cases filed in both systems has increased greatly and has become a
mounting problem. 88 The statistics do not indicate any potential or actual usurpation of state courts' power by the federal system. 89 The concerns of the attackers are occasionally hyperbolic and clearly misplaced.
82. The provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1973 &Supp. 1990), the removal statute,
and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990), the diversity statute, allow out-of-state
defendants and jllaintiffs, respectively, to "pull" adverse parties into federal court.
83. As a corollary to the ability to force litigants into federal court, the statutes similarly
bar other parties from using the federal forum where diversity is absent, or, for example, the
plaintiff is from out of state. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1973 & Supp. 1990) (does not allow
diverse defendants, who are citizens of the forum state and sued in state court, to remove
actions to district courts).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
85. See Wojan v. General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1988); Itel Containers
Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985); infra notes
113-70 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 109-70 and accompanying text.
87. See 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 2.
88. See V. FLANGO, C. BOERSEMA & D. BURNS, supra note 69, at 13-15.
89. Id.
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A logical step away from these failings is the incorporation of flexibility
into the utilization and scrutiny of diversity.
A relaxed view of jurisdiction is well supported. 90 History appears
to have settled the diversity question, at least for the present. The almost
unanimous support by attorneys who possess a vested interest in diversity jurisdiction ensures that the grant is not going to be abolished. 9'
Both defense and plaintiffs' bars are in favor of retaining diversity. 92 The
attempts in 1977 and 1978 to abolish diversity were defeated in Congress;
and the 1988 revisions to the statute perpetuate the grant through compromises, rather than attacks. 93 The quick death of recent proposals to
abolish or curtail diversity in both the House and the Senate confirms
that "interest seems to have subsided" in the drive to excise the grant
completely. 94 The lengthy debate and repetitive anti-diversity arguments
'95
are actually, "rather boring."
It is time to call off the fighting and work within the system. The
diversity jurisdiction scheme is vulnerable to abuse. The complete diversity rule creates a scourge of predicaments. The rule, if taken as a constitutional requirement, creates potential conflicts with judicially structured
exceptions 96 as well as congressionally enacted statutes, 97 and leads to
cumbersome and duplicative litigation. 98 For example, the rule might
encourage plaintiffs to try two suits, one with nondiverse parties in state
court, and one with diverse parties in federal court. This inevitably
would involve a duplication of judicial time and court costs, unduly taxing the system. It is ironic that plaintiffs may exclude individuals who
logically should be parties in order to maintain federal jurisdiction, ulti90. "The attack on diversity is worse than wrong, it is obsolete. It beats a dead horse,
seeking to cure an abuse which no longer exists." Frank, supra note 67, at 13.
91. 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 22, § 3602, at 363; Hearings
on Diversity, supra note 4, at 40 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("When it comes right down to
it, lawyers are opposed to the elimination of diversity because they want the choice of forum
.... ").

92. Hearings on Diversity, supra note 4, at 40-41 (statement of John P. Frank).
93. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 Comment (West Supp. 1990) (1988 Revision). The changes included: (1)increasing the required amount in controversy from $10,000 to $50,000, which will
obviously decrease the number of claims able to be filed in federal court, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1332(a), (b) (West Supp. 1990); (2) changing the citizenship for purposes of diversity action
of aliens who have established permanent residence, Id. § 1332(a); (3) establishing the domicile
of the decedent as the place of citizenship of the representative, Id. § 1332(c); and (4) modifying the citizenship of insurers in actions involving corporations and in which the insured was
not sued, Id. § 1332(c).
94. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.5, at 27 n.19

(1985).
95.
96.
97.
FED. R.
98.

Currie, supra note 39, at 4.
See infra notes 221-40.
Statutory interpleader requires only minimal diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988); cf
Civ. P. 22 (requiring complete diversity).
Currie, supra note 39, at 34.
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mately frustrating the policy of confining litigation and solving all related
disputes at one time.99 Complicated and unnecessarily time-consuming
disputes revolve around issues of citizenship to defeat a court's jurisdiction only by invoking the requirement of complete diversity. "These
costs .. . are too high to pay for this dubious principle ... that the
presence of adverse co-citizens is assurance against prejudice. If diversity
is retained, Strawbridge [introducing complete diversity] ought not to
be." 10 0 While the present order allows a thwarting of public and judicial
policies, there is a potential for a limited overhaul that ultimately will
lead to more just conclusions.
The Constitution "represents a pragmatic attempt to solve particular problems."' 0 1 When the exercise of a constitutionally granted power
defeats its purpose, courts should deal with the problem on a practical
level. Diversity jurisdiction should depend on needs and political compromises' 02-the needs of the public and the courts to process cases, and
the limited compromise of state judicial power in deference to a federal
system that is effectively a representation of states' interests. It should
not be grounded in tradition, inherent reasons that have lost their weight,
or moral principles at odds with reality.'0 3 When the internal workings
of the jurisdictional machinery jam, it is time to open the housing and fix
it from the inside. Solutions should seek to correct the quandaries,
4
rather than simply shifting the burden to a different forum.lC
Commentators have suggested increasing the numbers of judges and
ancillary staff, and enlarging the physical plant of state and federal courts
to accommodate the burden of increasing litigation.' 0 5 Although these
recommendations will go far towards easing the burden, they will not
solve the problems inherent in the present system's design. These concerns strike at the heart of justice and fair play, and demand attention to
bolster public and professional faith in litigation outcomes. Professor
99. See Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions, Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324
(1983):
Recently, and unprecedented in history, state and federal trial court judges are being
inundated with mass filings of lawsuits by individual plaintiffs, each seeking compensation and a share of large punitive damage awards, based on a single catastrophe or
the mass production and sale by one defendant of a defective product. The long arm
of these "big cases" ... ha[s] ensnared virtually thousands of courts in this country in
costly and repetitive litigation, threatening to last well into the next century.... [I]t
is not an overly pessimistic prediction that, absent some legislative or judicial solution, our attempt to try these virtually identical lawsuits, one-by-one, will bankrupt
both the state and federal court systems.
100. Currie, supra note 39, at 34; see Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary
and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 759, 783 (1972).
101. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 32, at 14.
102. Frankfurter, supra note 67, at 514-15.
103. Id.
104. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 32, at 26.
105. Id.
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David Currie believes that "j]urisdiction should be as self-regulated as
breathing.' ' 10 6 This may be an impossible goal. Attempts nevertheless
must be made to create a smoother-running machine.

II.

An Example of Where the System Is Not Working

This Section examines two aspects of diversity jurisdiction to illustrate the inherent problems of the rules as they stand and the violation of
equitable principles that results from these unyielding mandates. First,
this Section discusses the perceived constitutional imperviousness of a
party's right to challenge subject matter jurisdiction that has developed
in case law.' 0 7 The Section then presents cases that demonstrate the potential for exploitation of the rules by crafty litigants.
A.

The Invulnerability of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In general, diversity jurisdiction separates cases that may be heard
in the federal forum from those that belong in state courts, thus maintaining the limited jurisdiction of federal courts.' 0 8 When the litigants
and the court adequately investigate the jurisdictional basis for a suit, 1t9
no problems arise. This Section examines areas of probable and actual
abuse of the historic doctrine that subject matter jurisdiction may be
challenged at any time prior to final judgment." 0 This doctrine remains
a basic precept of federal jurisdiction."' Blind adherence to it, compounded by the complete diversity rule, permits misuse of the system,
creating a no-lose situation for clever counsel. Either party in a case in
federal court can avoid recognition of, or remain silent about, the lack of
diversity of citizenship-and therefore the absence of the court's jurisdic106. Currie, supra note 39, at 1.
107. Anomalous cases do arise, however. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
611 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (plaintiff who failed to deny or challenge removal
barred from subsequent challenge), aff'd, 818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1004 (1988); accord District of Columbia ex rel. American Constr., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 797 F.2d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (exercising discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 to
accept existence of diversity subsequently challenged by defendant, leaving open potential for
review); see also DiFrischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960) (denial
of motion for leave to amend); Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa.
1958) (denying leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is an exercise of discretion that seemingly is
based on "monstrous injustice" that would result from permitting defendant to change citizenship four days before state statute of limitations expired on plaintiff's claim).
108. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990).
109. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (federal
courts in diversity must be sure of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits); American
Motorists Ins. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 15, 16 (5th Cir. 1979).
110. Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 384; Capron v. van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804);
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
111. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546-47 (1986).
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tion-until the verdict is delivered.1 12 If the judgment is advantageous,
the party will continue in her silence. If she is unhappy with the results,
she will raise the jurisdictional issue loud and clear, requesting that the
verdict be set aside. According to the rule, if diversity-and
therefore
13
jurisdiction-is lacking, the case must be dismissed.
This practice has been promoted by two centuries of judicial
rulemaking. 114 Regardless of what the litigants do or what they intend to
do, subject matter jurisdiction is invincible. The prohibition on federal
jurisdiction over cases and controversies between nondiverse parties cannot be waived by consent, 115 conduct,1 16 estoppel, 117 inaction, 118 or stipulation. 119 This absolute protection of a state's control over suits
involving its citizens stems from the legendary but ultimately illusory
potential for the federal court system to eliminate the effectiveness of the
state courts,12 0 as well as the standard rigidity applied in all courts to
issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Although fears of an overreaching
federal court system never have been realized, the diversity system essentially remains unchanged.
The practical result of the interminable and indomitable nature of
the subject matter jurisdiction challenge is that a court, having decided a
case on its merits, is rendered powerless and its judgment given no
weight if there is an objection on the grounds of lack of diversity. 121 This
nullification of judicial decisions is reprehensible to ethical considerations. It creates a system wherein slyness and conniving may abrogate
the exercise of justice, robbing a respected and viable tribunal of its powers in a situation unsupported by any notion of fairness. It is unfair to
the litigant who has prevailed in federal court, 122 especially when that
party was unaware of the jurisdictional defect. Clearly, this is not the
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
113. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosingthe Issue of Subject-MatterJurisdictionBefore
FinalJudgment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 491, 492 (1967).
114. See, e.g., Bender, 475 U.S. at 546-47; Mansfield, 111 U.S. at 382; Capron, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 126; Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir. 1976); Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d
449, 453 (7th Cir. 1940), cert dismissed, 312 U.S. 710 (1941).
115. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975).
116. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934).
117. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1950).
118. Travis Mills Corp. v. Square D. Co., 67 F.R.D. 22, 26-27 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
119. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1974).
120. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 543 (statement of Patrick Henry) ("This is a dangerous
power which is instituted... [B]ecause there is a chance the strong, energetic government may
want it, it shall be produced and thrown in the general scale of power."); see also supra notes
58-70 and accompanying text.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) allows the challenge and a court may not hear a case over
which it does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra note 94, § 2.1, at 9-11. If the challenge is successful, the work of the federal
court is nullified.
122. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 492:
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123
preferred result in a system striving for efficient and effective justice.
12 4
The consequence gives parties a second bite at the apple of jurisdiction
when they are unhappy with the first. This creates public disgust and
distrust that is inapt 2 5 and potentially dangerous to the structure of our
democracy.
It is a perplexing task to explain or justify the continued vitality of
this procedural enigma. Precedent and consistency are important; however, the system must be enabled, in finite and limited situations, to check
the framework of procedure from impinging on the integrity of substantive justice. The anti-Federalists' original fear that the federal court system would override the state systems 2 6 has become moot. Modification
of original laws is a recurrent circumstance in our history. In every aspect of the government, old laws have fallen in response to perceived
changes in the underpinnings of these laws. 127 The strict reading of Rule
12(h)(3), allowing the challenge to diversity to come at any time, must
bow to greater values. The reality is that the federal and state systems
maintain peaceful coexistence and cooperation, even with the diversity

12
grant intact.

8

It is suggested that there are hidden agendas for continuing diversity
jurisdiction and the nonwaivability rule. Federal judges, forced to deal
with state law, probably embrace the doctrine allowing challenges to jurisdiction at any time. Diversity allows dismissal or remand of cases,
thus clearing the federal calendars. 129 Although this short-term gain alleviates the strain diversity puts on the federal courts, in the overall picture it cannot be justified. Moreover, even judges with crowded
calendars likely would agree that shifting cases to state courts after substantial progress has been made is costly and duplicative, and frustrates
the paramount goals of efficiency, economy, and fair and swift justice
that comprise the ideal the system seeks. 130
123. ALI STUDY, supra note 39, at 366 ("[T]his fetish of federal jurisdiction is wholly
inconsistent with sound judicial administration and can only serve to diminish respect for a
system that tolerates it. Some effective limitation on the raising and consideration of jurisdictional issues seems long overdue."); 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 22,
§ 3564, at 68-69 ("This very harsh procedure [of allowing jurisdictional challenges at late
stages of litigation] hardly can be defended as a sensible regulation of procedure; it can only be
justified in terms of the delicate problems of federal-state relations that are involved.").
124. Law v. Converse, 297 F. Supp. 1036, 1037 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
125. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 492.
126. See, e.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 2, at 542 (statement of Patrick Henry); see also supra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
127. Hunter, supra note 61, at 354-55.
128. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
129. "[C]rowded courts, working to clear dockets ... accept the broad, unadorned, and
quite erroneous statement that jurisdictional issues can be raised at any time." Dobbs, supra
note 113, at 510.
130. See supra notes 123, 125.
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For the vast majority of cases, the limitations on federal courts' jurisdiction are neither improper nor unduly restrictive. This Note addresses merely those exceptional circumstances, discussed in the
following subsection, in which dismissal or remand based on lack of diversity of citizenship is contrary to the goals of our procedural system.
The changes suggested by the proposal herein would affect the process of
those exceptional circumstances only.
B. The Reality of the Rule
Many courts dismiss cases after belated attacks on diversity jurisdiction.13 1 Dismissal (or remand, in the case of removed cases) is based on
132
the rule that subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time.
Examining the facts of some cases sheds light on the inequity and absence of logic in a system that allows this practice to continue unabated.
In Wojan v. GeneralMotors Corp., 133 a products liability action filed
in 1981, the complaint alleged that General Motors (GM) was "'a Delaware corporation, duly authorized to do business in the State of Illinois,' " and that the plaintiff was a citizen of Michigan. 134 GM admitted
that it was " 'licensed' to do business in Illinois"; but it failed to acknowledge its status as a Michigan citizen. Neither GM nor the court noticed
that a corporation's registration for business purposes is unrelated to the
question of jurisdiction based on citizenship, at which Wojan's cited allegation was directed. 13 5 Michigan was GM's principal place of business
136
and therefore its domicile for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
During the next five years, the case "plodded along"'137 in the district court, through three nonjurisdictional dismissals, after each of
which the action was reinstated. 138 On April 11, 1986, GM admitted the
existence of diversity in answer to Wojan's amended complaint, notwithstanding the plaintiff's admitted Michigan citizenship and GM's legally
acknowledged connection with the state, 139 and asserted numerous affirmative defenses not based on jurisdictional grounds. 140
Almost a year later, "GM pointed out to the court that despite its
earlier admission.., it had now discovered a serious problem concerning
131. See, eg., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1950); Wojan v.
General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1988); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico
Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985).
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
133. 851 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1988).
134. IdJ at 970.
135. Id
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988).
137. Wojan, 851 F.2d at 970.
138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Id
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the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case."' 4 1 This "serious
problem" was that both parties were citizens of Michigan. Because the
suit was in district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, the court
actually had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In light of this important
"discovery," GM moved to dismiss the action for want of diversity jurisdiction. On February 26, 1987, in deference to the rigid rule, the court
granted GM's motion. 142
Wojan lends itself to speculation regarding GM's counsel's strategy
in the case. Perhaps GM proceeded through the litigation, hoping to
exhaust Wojan's funds or win on the merits. Investing minimal time and
finance, GM would have been secure in the fact that whatever the outcome, it could not lose.14 3 When Wojan began actively seeking Rule 11
sanctions on other grounds,144 GM perhaps decided it was time to play
its trump card. 145 At that point, GM "'discovered'" the lack of diversity, purportedly because" 'one of the young lawyers' " working on the
case posed an innocent question regarding Wojan's citizenship, which
triggered the GM attorney's thinking process. 146 GM's counsel claimed
that the "question struck me like a brick, because the fact of the matter is
that my client's principal place of business is ...Michigan, Miss Wojan
1 47
lived in the state of Michigan, and I was stunned by the question.'
The court also was "stunned" that it took GM's attorneys so long to
find the glaring defect.148 Because Wojan's complaint was deficient in
alleging GM's state of principal place of business, 14 9 however, and because the burden of proof for establishing diversity is on the party asserting it, 150 GM was not assessed any Rule 11 sanctions. 151 The lower court
141. Id. at 971.
142. Id.
143. If GM succeeded on the merits, it could have remained silent and, unless Wojan was
aware of the jurisdictional defect, walked away a winner. If GM lost on the merits, it could
have challenged the court's jurisdiction and the judgment would have been void.
144. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
145. Wojan had moved for Rule 11 sanctions against GM's counsel for failure to cite a
prior decision, adverse to GM's position in the instant suit, in which GM had been the defendant. It was at the hearing on that motion that GM noted the "serious problem" concerning
the court's jurisdiction. Wojan, 851 F.2d at 971.
146. Id. at 975.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. The court noted that "with the aid of a little common sense," or "even a minimal
amount of research," plaintiff's counsel could have discovered GM's principal place of business, and that a proper complaint includes both the state of incorporation and the principal
place of business of a corporate party. Id. at 975.
150. Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988);
Western Transp. Co. v. Couzens Warehouse & Distrib., Inc., 695 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir.
1982).
151. The court noted "that if [GM's] counsel's conduct remained the same in the face of
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conceded its participation in creating the problem by not inquiring early
152
on as to the jurisdictional issue."
Itel Containers International Corporation v. Puerto Rico Marine
Management,Inc. 153 demonstrates more forthright attempts at a "second
bite" at the apple. The Itel Containers defendants, Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc. (PRMMI), employed a shrewd litigation strategy of
avoiding the diversity issue for as long as possible. 154 They noticed the
jurisdictional error in the plaintiff's complaint, but failed to bring it to
either the plaintiff's or the court's attention. PRMMI carefully avoided
answering the complaint's jurisdictional allegations, failed to raise lack of
jurisdiction as an affirmative defense, made a motion to dismiss on nonjurisdictional grounds, and asserted a counterclaim. 155 PRMMI also responded on the merits to a motion for summary judgment and
purposefully crafted nonresponsive answers to interrogatories to main56
tain their trump card of lack of diversity.'
The distinction between Itel Containers and Wojan, aside from the
specific strategies, is twofold. First, counsel for PRMMI admitted that
from the outset they were aware of the lack of diversity and that they
employed tactics specifically designed to delay the litigation. PRMMI's
counsel claimed that because they believed the plaintiff's claims were
meritless, the strategy would delay resolution of the issues until the state
statute of limitations had run. At least some of the claims, therefore,
effectively would be defeated.15 7 In light of Rule 12(h)(3), counsel
thought this was a proper maneuver.' 5 8 PRMMI used the complete diversity rule in tandem with the "whenever rule" to plan a litigation
course. GM, however, seemingly did not plan to invoke the rules until it
'discovered' that its principal place of business was Michigan when
Wojan moved for Rule 11 sanctions, five years into the litigation.
Another difference between Wojan and Itel Containers is that the
Itel Containers court assessed significant sanctions against the defendant
for its strategy.159 PRMMI was required to pay some of plaintiff's attorplaintiff's properly pleaded jurisdictional allegations, we wouldn't hesitate to affirm sanctions
imposed for conduct similar to that of counsel for GM." Wojan, 851 F.2d at 975.
152. Id. at 974.
153. 108 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985).
154. IU at 97.
155. The court noted that "assertion of the counterclaim was particularly pernicious,"
because such a claim implied either ancillary or independent jurisdiction over the claim,
thereby establishing an additional false assertion of diversity. Id. at 98 n.l.
156. Id. at 97.
157. Id.; see also id. at 99.
158. Id at 103.
159. Id.at 105-06. The court found the defendant PRMMI in violation of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 7 (failure to sign papers according to Rule 11), 11 (failure of reasonable
inquiry), 16 (failure to participate in pretrial conference in good faith), and 26(g) (abuse of
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6
ney's fees and $5,000 to the court for "abuse of the judicial process."'I
The Wojan court did not impose sanctions on GM, mainly because the
plaintiff breached her duty to investigate jurisdiction.
The Itel Containers court apparently believed that defendant's
schemes were too vicious to impute any dereliction to the plaintiff in certifying jurisdiction.16' "[T]he defendant was causing the court to engage
in a meaningless exercise in which the defendant could not lose." 62 This
no-lose situation, achieved by dissolute, albeit legal, manipulation of the
jurisdictional rules, represented an ethical barrier the judge was not prepared to allow the litigants to breach. "Vigorous advocacy... does not
mean the advocate may dishonor the judicial system and
demean the
163
court simply because it will advance his client's cause."'
Assessing sanctions against a litigant and her counsel for abusing
the system does not satisfy the ends of justice. Itel Containers' complete
costs were not included, 164 and therefore the sanctions did not return the
plaintiff to her position prior to the litigation; more importantly, it is
likely that the sanctions were substantially less than the potential recovery the plaintiff could have won on the merits in state court. Conceivably, PRMMI could have won the suit on the merits without relying on
the lack of diversity claim. This would have eliminated any potential for
sanctions, and done nothing to serve justice since PRMMI's knowing
abuse of the system would have been the reason for their success.
A weighty consideration is that a good faith plaintiff still has received no legal remedy and has spent an unacceptable amount of time
and money merely to discover that the parties are nondiverse. Extended
time in district court, with or without sanctions, seems a high price for a
party and the court to pay to establish the citizenship of the litigants.
This plaintiff must now renew her suit in state court, without the benefit
of a binding decision from the district court. Additionally, if the state
statute of limitations has run, the plaintiff has nowhere to go.
Other factors may be at the heart of "second bite" schemes. A
delayed jurisdictional challenge may cause a loss of witnesses, evidence,
and memory. These possibilities also encourage nondiverse litigants with
flimsy cases to stall the challenge as long as possible to weaken the other
side. PRMMI's delay, through which it hoped to run out the statute of
limitations, is an analogous approach. The litigant also may anticipate a
serendipitous judgment, and therefore may invest minimal time and finances in the initial suit. If the result is inimical to the litigant, she may

discovery process), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (liability for excessive costs and attorneys' fees
for unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings).
160. Id. at 106.
161. See id. at 105.
162. Id. at 99 n.2.
163. Id. at 101.
164. Id. at 106 (attorneys' fees from pretrial conferences not recoverable).
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challenge the court's jurisdiction, get the case dismissed, and commit all
the time and money she would have allotted to the initial suit if it had
been her only "bite."
Sanctions are a small step towards deterring bad faith tactics and
preventing litigation from "becoming more like an alley brawl than a
search for truth." 165 A more functional and complete solution to the
problem of the "whenever rule," however, is the development of a predetermined outcome to delayed attacks on subject matter jurisdiction based
on lack of diversity. 166 Sanctions are after-the-fact, incomplete, and
wholly inadequate as a panacea for this exploitation of the judicial process.1 67 Itel Containersand Wojan illustrate the defendant's attempt to
1 68
benefit from the dilemma created by the rule.
Defendants are not the only ones who can get second bites. In
Lackawanna Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble PaperProducts
Co., 169 the plaintiff sued in federal court, claimed jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship, participated in extensive discovery, and never
raised the issue of citizenship either before or during trial. The defendants admitted the allegations of diversity. After receiving an unfavorable
verdict, the plaintiff challenged the court's jurisdiction for want of diver170
sity, and the action was dismissed.
These cases demonstrate an almost magical aspect 171 to jurisdiction,
which allows litigants a second bite at the apple in several specific situa165. Id. at 101.
166. See infra notes 177-95 and accompanying text.
167. An interesting puzzle develops from the dilemma of a court rendering sanctions
against a party over which it has no jurisdiction. Although there has been a split in the circuits, it generally is believed that courts have the "inherent" power to render sanctions even
though they do not have the jurisdiction to render judgment on the merits. Wojan v. General
Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,
764 F.2d 1148, 1153 n.4 (5th Cir. 1985) (no power to render sanctions if diversity jurisdiction
absent); cf United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (courts have jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction). Most circuits follow the rule that the "inherent powers of federal
courts are those that 'are necessary to the exercise of all others.'" Roadway Express Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812)). The Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari to resolve this question. Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 275 (1989).
168. For further illustration, see Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. dismissed, 312 U.S. 710 (1941). After an adverse judgment, the defendant's counsel determined
that he had overlooked the issue of diversity, which coincidentally was lacking, and therefore
the judgment was void. Id. at 454. In American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6
(1951), after an adverse judgment, the diverse defendant successfully challenged the court's
jurisdiction. The defendant based the challenge on the citizenship of a nondiverse codefendant
who was dismissed from the suit before judgment. Id. at 17-18. Although the challenging
defendant properly could have been sued by the plaintiff in the district court, the court blindly
adhered to the rule and dismissed the action. Id. at 18-19.
169. 86 F.R.D. 330 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
170. Id. at 331, 333-34.
171. See, eg., McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 877 (3d Cir. 1968) (recognizing that "the
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tions. With a sweep of the hand and the mention of the words "lack of
diversity," an attorney conjures an incantation that renders the otherwise
valid judgment invisible. The absence of jurisdiction often does not depend on, nor is it integrated in, any analysis based on notions of fair
play; 1 72 and the results in these cases often seem conspicuously inequitable. Surely there are many valid challenges to subject matter jurisdiction
that should be afforded all the power that the rules embody. Where such
disputes are the result of negligent or abusive litigation subterfuges, how73
ever, the system no longer should condone use or abuse of the rule. 1

I1.

Remedying the Problem With Diversity

The supernatural aspects of the "whenever rule" may be eliminated
while retaining diversity's original power as a functional protector of federalism. This Section proposes rectifying the obstacle to efficient settlement of controversies by invoking an estoppel concept for the assertion
of diversity of citizenship. 174 There is important academic and judicial
support for the estoppel concept, despite its acknowledged controversion
of "deep-rooted assumptions" regarding
attacks on the subject matter
175
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
A.

A Proposal for Defeating Second Bites at the Jurisdictional Apple

In considering alternative solutions to rectifying the problems with
diversity, Professor Currie has remarked that "[h]ere, as always, it is easier to criticize than to construct a satisfactory alternative."' 176 This proposal's suggestions present a just solution to a major problem of
diversity. The proposal deals specifically with the impasse that results
from the absolute protection of diversity challenges under the "whenever
notion that 'jurisdiction' is a subject of some magical quality so that a decision against jurisdiction prevents according recognition to other relevant considerations," but rejecting that notion
in deference to court's statutory construction), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
172. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 498, 503.
173. See, e.g., DiFrischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960) (denial of motion for leave to amend); see also Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252
(W.D. Pa. 1958) (denying leave to amend under Rule 15(a) exercise of discretion but seemingly based on "monstrous injustice" that would result from permitting defendant to change
citizenship four days before state statute of limitations expired on plaintiff's claim). See generally Stephens, Estoppel to Deny Federal Jurisdiction- Klee and DiFrischia Break Ground, 68
DICK. L. REV. 39, 40 (1963) (discussing how Klee and DiFrischiawere a break with the past
that "hopefully may provide a springboard for 'assault upon the citadel' of non-waiver and
non-consent in federal jurisdiction").
174. See, e.g., DiFrischia,279 F.2d at 144. Although DiFrischiastands for the proposition
that a defendant will be estopped from denying previously admitted jurisdiction, it has been
criticized and effectively eviscerated by Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
377 n.21 (1978).
175. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 529.
176. Currie, supra note 39, at 11.
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rule" of Rule 12(h)(3). 17 7 In each situation, the proposed estoppel doctrine prevents abusive strategies, but does not preclude the ability of litigants to file and succeed on authentic, good faith contests of diversity
jurisdiction.
A carefully worded and constructed statute or rule would provide
the necessary guidance to courts and litigants, without leaving the equitable doctrine of estoppel open to endless permutation and interpretation.
Courts are mostly unwilling to invoke estoppel on their own in light of
the precedent and statutory interpretation. 178 It is more likely that
courts would follow the directive from Congress or the Supreme Court.
At the very least a modification of Rule 12(h)(3) is necessary.
A new rule or statute should not be construed as an open invitation
to litigants to invoke federal jurisdiction at their whim. Nor must it suggest an end to the ideas of complete and minimal diversity developed by
the Court. A new rule or statute should put both parties and judges on
notice that jurisdiction is a preeminent issue that must be resolved at the
outset of any litigation and that failure to do so will not result in improper second bites at the jurisdictional apple.
The new rule should comprise a simple and rather general equation.
In an action filed in or removed to a district court on diversity of citizenship grounds, the parties would be estopped from challenging diversity
jurisdiction after an answer has been fied or a reasonable period of time
1 79
has passed subsequent to the allegation of diversity of citizenship.
This quasi-estoppel would take the form of a rebuttable presumption that
the district court has jurisdiction over the case. Parties with valid challenges, assessed by the court as meritorious, would be granted dismissal
or remand where appropriate.180 The presumption may be defeated
when a party shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not
know and could not have known of the lack of diversity. If this burden
cannot be met, the merits of the case would be decided by the district
court. The decision regarding dismissal of the suit would lie in the discretion of the district court, which should apply the same standards applied to a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. 18 1 If the Rule
60(b) standard is not met, the court would be deemed to have
jurisdiction.
The following four examples illustrate the application of the rule:
177. See supra notes 113-170 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 108-173 and accompanying text.
179. See Dobbs, supra note 113, at 504 (despite prohibition of waiver of objection or consent to jurisdiction, "one might be estopped to assert the jurisdictional defect").
180. Cases that were removed from state to federal court could be remanded to the state
court. Cases originally filed in federal court would ba dismissed.
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (relief from judgment for mistakes, inadvertence, excusable
neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud).
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(1) PlaintiffInitiates FederalCourt Jurisdiction

A plaintiff who brings suit in district court, initially invoking the
jurisdiction of the court, would be estopped from amending the complaint based on the plaintiff's citizenship.1 82 A plaintiff who has chosen
the federal forum would be deemed, therefore, to have submitted to the
court's jurisdiction.
(2) PlaintiffFails to Challenge Removal
A plaintiff who initiates litigation in state court and does not challenge diversity of the parties upon defendant's motion to remove the case
to district court would be estopped, after a reasonable time, from asserting lack of diversity of the parties based on the plaintiff's citizenship. A
plaintiff in a removed suit who discovers that the defendant has
fabricated her citizenship for purposes of gaining removal to the federal
court, however, would not be estopped from challenging jurisdiction
based on nondiversity of the parties. This challenge must be made within
a reasonable time after discovery of the prevarication to avoid the potential of a "wait-and-see" strategy by a plaintiff aware of the fact that the
defendant is not of diverse citizenship.
(3) Defendant Fails to Challenge FederalJurisdiction
A defendant, sued in federal court, would be estopped from pleading
lack of diversity based on the citizenship of any defendant after a pleading responsive to the jurisdictional issue is or should have been filed, or
after a reasonable time has passed. 8 3 A defendant who shows that the
plaintiff fabricated her citizenship to bring the suit in federal court would
not be estopped from challenging diversity jurisdiction. This challenge,
however, must be made within a reasonable time of discovery of the
falsehood to prevent "second bite" tactics. The issue of diversity shall be
1 84
deemed admitted if the defendant fails to deny it in the answer.
(4) Defendant Removes
A defendant sued in state court who removes the case based on diversity of citizenship would be estopped from subsequently challenging
the federal court's jurisdiction based on the nondiversity of any defendant's citizenship 85 unless a codefendant has deceived the defendant or
182. See, e.g., Lackawanna Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prods. Co.,
86 F.R.D. 330, 331 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
183. See, e.g., Wojan v. General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1988); Page v.
Wright, 116 F.2d 449, 450 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. dismissed, 312 U.S. 710 (1941).
184. This is similar to Rule 8(d): "Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading
is required ... are admitted when not denied." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d).
185. See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 19 (1950) (Douglas, J.,

dissenting) ("I think petitioner, having asked for and obtained removal of the case ...

and
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the court. In that case the defendant must challenge jurisdiction within a
reasonable time after the discovery. In addition, jurisdiction may be contested based on the plaintiff's citizenship within a reasonable time, after
which the defendant must overcome the presumption of diversity.
False assertions and vexatious avoidance of the issue of citizenship
by a party would not estop the opposing party from challenging the
court's jurisdiction, provided that the challenging party is not the one
who chose the forum in the first place. "[T]he one who invoked federal
consequence of th[e] judgment...
jurisdiction and as a result suffered the
18 6
should not be heard to complain."
Courts utilizing the rule could develop a sliding scale approach to
decisions challenging the presumption of jurisdiction. Considerations
should include the stage of the litigation, the length and nature of inforum, and
volvement of the parties, which party chose the federal 187
whether any judgment has been rendered in a lower court.
This factored decision regarding exercise of jurisdiction over a case
that, standing alone, the federal court has no power to hear, is nearly
identical to the doctrine invoked by the Supreme Court to decide
whether courts should remand or maintain pendent state claims when all
federal claims have dropped out of a suit in federal court.18 8 Discretion
having lost its case in that court, is now estopped from having it remanded to the state
court.").
186. Id at 21. A party's affirmative choice of forum should have significant weight in
deciding a subsequent motion to dismiss based on lack ofjurisdiction of the forum chosen. An
analogous proposition exists when dealing with personal jurisdiction. When a plaintiff chooses
the forum, the plaintiff's objections to personal jurisdiction are deemed waived as to any counterclaims subsequently filed. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). The important
distinction between personal jurisdiction and the notions of federalism inherent in the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts may minimize the persuasiveness of this analogy, but it
nevertheless demonstrates a situation in which the party choosing the forum is bound by that
decision. Assuming that state sovereignty is not threatened by the exercise of federal jurisdiction over diversity cases, however, intimates that the same may be true for those cases in which
a party chooses a forum and subsequently is barred from "unchoosing" it.
187. The standard belief is that subject matter jurisdiction may not be attacked collaterally. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). It is arguable,
however, that Rule 60(b)(4) still leaves the collateral attack avenue open.' FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4) (relief from judgment where judgment is void). But cf 7 J. MOORE, supra note 9,
%,60.25 (jurisdictional defect subject to collateral attack only when the court "plainly usurped"
its power and not when the court has the general power to hear the suit in question); see also
Dobbs, supra note 113, at 494-96 (federal courts have the "power to decide wrongly"). The
proposal would eliminate any confusion on this question. Parties attempting to invoke Rule
60(b)(4) on the grounds that the judgment was void for its lack of diversity jurisdiction would
be held to the same rebuttable presumption standard, rather than being afforded immediate
relief because the judgment was "void" for lack of diversity. In these situations, lack of diversity would not make a judgment void without proof that the complaining party did not and
should not have known that the court lacked jurisdiction. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
188. See, eg., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S, 343 (1988); Rosado v. Wyman,
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to dismiss or remand pendent claims is based on considerations of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." 18 9 If these factors
do not come into play, the Court cautions hesitation in hearing state
claims. 190 The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, however, is a judicially
created expansion of jurisdiction; the doctrine allows the courts to shape
jurisdictional constructs in light of these enumerated interests.1 91 This
treatment of pendent claims responds to fears of foreclosure of valid state
claims and concerns for promoting the "prompt and efficient resolution
of controversies."'' 92 The Court thereby is bending the strict rules of jurisdiction in deference to fairness and flexibility, not power. The very
basis of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine embodies an acknowledgement
that absolute rules do not work in certain situations, or else state claims
standing alone after elimination of their associated federal claims automatically would be eliminated from the federal courts.
The Court's suggestions regarding pendent jurisdiction also counsel
a weighing of exploitative tactics engaged in by the parties. 193 If such
tactics are evident, the district court "should take this behavior into account in determining" whether to remand to "guard against forum manipulation."' 194 The Court has stressed the importance of this flexibility;
it is far better than an obdurate rule that would defeat the concepts of
95
fairness in the doctrine.
Likewise, a new statute or rule amending the rigidity of Rule
12(h)(3) depends on similar interests of flexibility and equity. If the
court decides that a party is attempting to take an improper second bite
at the apple, the party would be held estopped from pleading lack of
diversity. The jurisdiction of the federal court should then be as complete for the case as if it had been filed in state court. The judgment
would be as binding as if jurisdiction existed at the outset; and the jurisdictional decision of the court would be overturned only for a clear abuse
of discretion.
A notable and meaningful effect of the proposal would be that the
courts can cease sanctioning collusive, manipulative parties. 196 The
courts will be able to bind litigants merely by a traditional estoppel rule
adapted to diversity, rather than by punitive, retaliatory sanctions. Most
397 U.S. 397, 402-05 (1970) (mootness of federal claim does not eliminate jurisdiction of the
district court over pendent statutory claim); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726-29 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion).
189. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 349; United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726.
190. United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726.
191. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 349.
192. Id. at 353.
193. Id. at 357.
194. Id.

195.

Id.

196. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108
F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985). See also supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
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essentially, parties now would obtain a better brand of justice because the
cases would be heard on the merits. This contrasts with situations in
which, for example, a defendant is sanctioned for failure to respond to
interrogatories regarding her citizenship, but the plaintiff's state court
cause of action is time-barred, leaving the plaintiff without an adequate
judicial remedy. In this scenario, sanctions merely multiply the
problems rather than solve them.
The concept of sanctions as a remedy for abuse of our jurisdictional
system is antithetical to fairness and to the portent of this Note. Solutions for defects in our procedural system require an examination of options and selection of the best available method, represented by the
proposal herein.
B. Knocking Down the Hurdles to the Proposal: Judicial Structuring of the
Diversity Statute
Although this proposal appears to fly in the face of a principle based
in statute, 197 case law, 198 and the Constitution, 199 this subsection will
demonstrate that it is a logical extension of the judicial rulemaking surrounding diversity jurisdiction. Two hurdles threaten the success of the
proposal: the problem of statutory interpretation and the question
whether the Constitution permits jurisdiction by estoppel. While a statutory change would be most appropriate, the courts already have laid the
groundwork for a construction of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. Section
1332 upon which the proposal could rest.
2 °°
The Strawbridge complete diversity rule is old if nothing else.
Although it carries with it the weight of nearly two centuries of precedent, this fact alone makes it neither effective nor efficient. "When precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to support
''
a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it. 201
Although contentions regarding crowded dockets and the nature of the
federalism concept still are bandied about by the abolitionists, we live in
a time that demands a move towards concentrated cooperative efforts
and away from restrictive notions of sovereignty that are urealistic in
the setting of diversity jurisdiction. Professor Dobbs, who has suggested
a case law construction similar to the proposal of this Note, believes that
"[n]othing prevents judicial reform of these rules except traditional judicial inertia and perhaps a misconceived notion, surely inherited from the
Middle Ages, that it would be insulting for federal courts to try cases
197.
198.
Capron
199.
200.
201.

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1989).
See, eg., Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884);
v. van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (rule of complete diversity).
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting).
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'belonging' to state courts. ' 202 Even recognizing the importance of stare
decisis and the rights of the states to decide controversies concerning
their citizens, when the rules make no exceptions for cases like Wojan,
203
Professor Dobbs' "misconceived notion" theory may be correct.
State courts would not balk if federal courts were allowed to decide
cases between nondiverse parties who have concealed the absence of diversity and invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts. A similar doctrine of convenience exists regarding federal jurisdiction over pendent
state claims after all federal claims have been disposed of,2° 4 and has
been suggested to relax the requirements of independent jurisdiction for
permissive counterclaims. 20 5 Regardless of how the abolitionists or Congress may feel about diversity, it is also doubtful that they are willing to
reward litigants who successfully manipulate the system while seriously
impairing both the integrity and the resources of the courts. Those rewards are a direct result of the complete diversity rule, 20 6 the "whenever
rule" challenge, 207 and the failure of the courts to use doctrines of estoppel and waiver in this sacred cow-diversity jurisdiction as a form of
20 8
subject matter jurisdiction-borne of ancient jurisprudence.
In the limited situations like Wojan and Itel Containers, in which
litigants attempt to escape the jurisdiction of a federal court after a
knowing invocation of that court's power, a statutory construction allowing the federal court to exercise jurisdiction over nondiverse parties is
in order. Section 1332 does not expressly proscribe the application of
rational, equitable procedural principles in line with the suggestions
herein. The suggested proposal fashions a method of administration
more efficient, effective, and responsive to the interests of truth-seeking
and prompt resolution of disputes than the old rule.
A longstanding tradition supports the suggestion for principled canons of practice. Judicial structuring of the business of administering
diversity cases has involved two centuries of precedent outside the plain
language of both the statute20 9 and the Constitution. 21 0 The remainder
of this Section illustrates two different types of judicially created rules.
The first type are rules of procedure promoting an efficient and dependable policy regarding diversity. The second type are rules that have gone
202.

Dobbs, supra note 113, at 529.

203.

Id.

204. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
205. United States ex rel. D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430
F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring) ("it is no longer thought the heavens
will fall if a federal court deals with a nonfederal question when it is convenient to do so");
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
206. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). See supra note 6.
208.
209.

210.

See supra notes 115-19.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1989).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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far towards relaxing diversity, suggesting that the present proposal is not
as radical as it may seem. Although the constitutional question logically
should be addressed first, support for its resolution naturally follows the
discussion of case law and statutory interpretation, and therefore this is
the starting point. The Section concludes with a few decisions rendered
2 11
contrary to the rigid rules.
(1)

Administering Diversity Jurisdiction

A necessary function of the courts is the administration of the statutes defining jurisdiction. The courts have formulated various practices
in the diversity area. The burden of proof of diversity lies on the party
claiming it and attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction over the suit.2 12
For the purposes of determining whether diversity exists, the courts use
the parties' citizenship at the time of filing. 2 13 Once established, diversity
is not changed by a subsequent geographic move of a party. 2 14 The court
in any diversity action first must assess and affirm its jurisdiction before
2 15
proceeding to the merits.
These rules were designed as logical, practical, and necessary tools
for bringing about the correct and competent function of the system, and
for preventing parties from exploiting and manipulating litigation in their
favor. The rules are not required or implied by the statutory language,
yet they ensure a smooth-running machine that litigants can rely on in
pursuing dispute resolution.
The proposal in this Note complies with these concepts. It furnishes
predictable results, prevents the problems of protracted litigation regarding jurisdiction, 21 6 and precludes hidden agendas from thwarting the adjudication of controversy. As such, it easily could fall within a
straightforward interpretation of either the language of the diversity statute or the intention of those who drafted it.
211. Hoffman v. Lenyo, 433 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1970); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867
(3d Cir. 1968); DiFrischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960); Law v.
Converse, 297 F. Supp. 1036 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1969).
212. Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988);
Western Transp. Co. v. Couzens Warehouse & Distribs., Inc., 695 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir.

1982).
213. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957); Gibson v. Bruce, 108 U.S. 561, 563
(1882) (citizenship at time of filing and at time of removal must be diverse).
214. Smith, 354 U.S. at 93 n.1; Gibson, 108 U.S. at 563.
215. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); cf American Motorists Ins. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 15, 16 (5th Cir. 1979) (allegation that all three parties-were "foreign corporations" licensed for business in Louisiana did
not show that the parties were diverse).
216. See Currie, supra note 39, at 1.
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(2) Rules Relaxing the Requirements of Complete Diversity: Vaulting the
ConstitutionalHurdles

Although federal jurisdiction cannot be waived by consent, conduct,
estoppel, inaction, or stipulation,2 17 the courts have exercised some discretion over jurisdictional issues, allowing extensions where convenience
and common sense have indicated it would be appropriate. Thus, a court
can protect federal court jurisdiction by refusing to allow joinder of nondiverse, nonindispensable parties, if allowing the joinder would defeat
that jurisdiction, prejudice the plaintiff, and lead to an inequitable result.2 18 Although the presence or joinder of an indispensable, nondiverse
party does defeat jurisdiction,2 1 9 in the case of a nonindispensable party
the court is exercising its discretion to hear a case that would fail for lack
of diversity jurisdiction but for the court's preclusion of the joinder. The
federal court thereby is retaining control over a case that could be, and
under Strawbridge should be, in a state court. This adjustment to the
strict rules may be based on two reasons, both founded in fairness. First,
the joinder is precluded because the plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the
absence of the party and because the joinder possibly is a litigation strategy to defeat federal jurisdiction.2 20 The addition of nondiverse,
nonindispensable parties may amount to a manipulation of the process
that the courts in their discretion can refuse to allow. 221 Alternatively,
the joinder may be precluded because of the stage of the litigation and
the burdens the joinder will put on the present controversy, as well as the
drag such a practice will put on the dockets in the aggregate.
The courts have fashioned exceptions to the diversity requirement in
a wide range of contexts, finding that Article III of the Constitution imposes no real obstacle to legislative or judicial extension of federal diversity jurisdiction, as long as at least one party on the plaintiff side is from a
different state than one defendant. This so-called "minimal diversity"
requirement,2 22 first propounded in the interpleader area, has been codified under 28 U.S.C. Section 1335.223 Intervention decisions have held
217. See supra notes 115-19.
218. See, e.g., Depriest v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 119 F.R.D. 639 (M.D. La. 1988) (precluding joinder of nonindispensable, nondiverse party).
219. See, e.g., Haas v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 442 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1971); FED. R.
Civ. P. 19(a) (indispensable parties).
220. This example assumes that the plaintiff is trying to add a nondiverse party who would
defeat jurisdiction and therefore require the district court to dismiss or remand the case to
state court.
221. Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987) (court should consider
plaintiff's motive, timeliness of motion, whether plaintiff will suffer injury by nonjoinder, "and
any other factors bearing on the equities"); Depriest, 119 F.R.D. at 640 (no prejudice to plaintiff, therefore nonindispensable, nondiverse party not allowed to be added).
222. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1) (1988) ("Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship ....").
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that joinder of nondiverse, nonindispensable intervenors of right does not
defeat a federal court's jurisdiction. 224 Class action suits similarly require only minimal diversity. 225 Without the extension of jurisdiction
provided by the doctrine, these types of favored suits would be severely
restricted. Because class actions suits are a special category of action,
designed for efficiency and finality, 226 the courts have stretched the rules
to facilitate their maintenance.
Minimal diversity is satisfied and nondiverse parties are allowed to
sue in federal court under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13 and 14,
governing amendments and third-party pleading. Parties impleaded as
third-party defendants need not be diverse from the plaintiff or the thirdparty plaintiff.227 The jurisdictional basis of the original suit provides
ancillary jurisdiction to the impleaded third-party claim. 228 Once the
third-party defendant is in the suit, she may assert any cross-claims
against a nondiverse plaintiff and must assert any counterclaims against
the nondiverse third-party plaintiff.229 Any nondiverse claims remaining
after a dismissal of the original case on other than jurisdictional grounds
will continue to final judgment in federal court. 230 Thus, a federal court
may adjudicate nonfederal claims between two parties from the same
state. There is absolutely no diversity in these situations. The practice is
sound, however, and grounded in doctrines of logic, practicality, neces23 1
sity, and faimess.
The augmentation of diversity jurisdiction presented above betrays
the Strawbridge rule for what it is: a vestigial tail that continues to wag
the dog of equity and economy. Although much of this restructuring has
been codified in statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it began with logical reasoning by common law courts. 2 32 When diversity
serves its valid purpose, which currently includes maintaining a limit on
the number of cases that can get to federal courts, it is well-received.
224. See Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v. Burckhalter, 327 F. Supp. 648, 649 (W.D. Okla.
1971); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a); Kennedy, supra note 30, at 362-63.
225. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
226. See, e.g., Proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 39
F.R.D. 69, 99 (1966).
227. FED. R. CIv. P. 14.
228. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367 n.2, 368 n.3 (1978); see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
229. Owen, 437 U.S. at 367 n.2; FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
230. See, e.g., Fairview Park Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122,
1125 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Atlantic Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 907, 910 (1st Cir. 1962)
("Jurisdiction which has once attached is not lost by subsequent events.").

231. For analogous doctrine in federal question cases, see also supra notes 188-95 and
accompanying text, which provides a discussion of pendent jurisdiction over remaining state
claims.
232. See, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (ancillary jurisdiction); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860) (same).
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When its tenets contradict common sense, fairness, or attempts at efficiency, however, it usually is put aside. This proposal merely adopts
such valid reasoning for one more limited, albeit glaring, set of circumstances. Any concept of jurisdiction must be capable of adjustment in
the interest of maintaining public respect.
A final consideration is the preclusive weight in subsequent litigation accorded to a judgment rendered in a federal court that did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Under federal res judicata doctrine, a judgment rendered by a court that did not have jurisdiction nevertheless will be given preclusive affect as to issues of
jurisdiction. 233 The res judicata doctrine is logical, but it also puts holes
in the otherwise invulnerable shield of protection given to subject matter
jurisdiction challenges. 234 This weakening of the shield furthers the credibility of a system that acknowledges the need for finality by preventing
the majority of successful challenges after the point of final judgment.
The proposal here would strengthen the courts' credibility by advancing
the preclusive effect, affording litigants and the public a system they
could understand and depend on to deliver consistent messages.
A point worth addressing is the contention that Article III of the
Constitution mandates at least minimal diversity, which the proposal
here does not require. 2 35 The express language of Article III, "between
Citizens of different States, '' 236 seems clear enough. A pure literal reading, however, militates against several of the extensions discussed in the
previous paragraphs, extensions that the Supreme Court has sanctioned
and upheld. 237 More practically, rules of procedure precluding untimely

objections to jurisdiction through concepts of estoppel or waiver are not
as aberrant as usually is assumed. 238 "Both scholarly and judiciary opinion grossly exaggerate existing rules that permit tardy jurisdictional attacks. ' ' 239

Professor Dobbs has presented

convincing and

firmly

grounded evidence that no constitutional barrier exists to requiring
233. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
n.9 (1982); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940); Stoll
v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938); see also Dobbs, supra note 113, at 494-96 (courts
have the "power to decide wrongly").
234. Although the res judicata rule creates another hole, language in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), which allows for relief from a void judgment, may patch it. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(4) ("the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment [if] the judgment is
void"); supra note 187; ef 7 J. MOORE, supra note 9, 60.25[2] (jurisdictional defect subject to
collateral attack only when court "plainly usurped" its power and not when court has the
general power to hear the type of suit in question).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 227-34 for evidence that this argument already
has been foreclosed by the action of the courts in interpreting the Federal Rules.
236. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
237. See supra notes 217-34 and accompanying text.
238. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 506-07.
239. Id. at 507.
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timely resolution of jurisdictional issues and barring objections based on
lack of diversity after an early phase of normal proceedings. 240 No rationale, aside from the historical weight, is given for granting subject
matter jurisdiction greater deference than issues such as venue or personal jurisdiction, which are deemed waived if not objected to early
on.24 1 The notice and fair opportunity to be heard requirements of due
process would be satisfied by such a procedure; historical weight more
than textual fact permeates and protects the rule. The absence of a constitutional directive regarding the determination of jurisdictional concerns indicates that the Framers expected the courts to select standard
methods of procedure for all related issues. 242
These theories are supported by the American Law Institute24 3 and
scholarly construction of the necessary interplay between the state and
federal governments. 244 Only history, therefore, can offer a reason to bar
the exercise of reasonable procedural rules. The Strawbridgerule and the
"whenever rule" both are grounded in a keynote theme that strikes at the
heart of America's republican structure: the separation of national and
state governments based on an outdated and irrational fear that fundamental separation will vanish if federal courts are allowed to decide diversity actions. No evidence, however, supports this concern or the
related argument that federal courts apply state laws erroneously or erratically. 245 Aside from these emotionally based, deeply entrenched objections, "there
is nothing unconstitutional about jurisdiction by
''246
estoppel.
(3) Courts Bending the Rules
In certain cases, a failure to challenge diversity jurisdiction already
has been treated in a fashion analogous to a failure to challenge other
claims and has been deemed an admission that subsequently could not be
challenged. 24 7 The courts in these cases did not discuss the conflict with
240. Id at 520.
241. Id.
242. Id
243. ALI STUDY, supra note 39, at 368 ("The Reporters do not believe that a system that
imposes reasonable limitations on the opportunity to raise issues of subject matter jurisdiction,
even issues going to the court's power under Article III, is unconstitutional.").
244. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 32, at 25 ("The Constitution envisions a working
partnership between the state and federal courts under which each forum may enforce the law
of the other sovereign whenever it is deemed appropriate.").
245. Hearings on Diversity, supra note 4, at 42 (statement of John Frank); see also Frank,
supra note 67, at 682 ("[W]ith a high degree of uniformity, the system has been generally
satisfactory. It is a rare loser who feels that he would have been much better off in a different
system.").
246. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 506, 520-21.
247. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(plaintiff who failed to deny or challenge removal barred from subsequent challenge), aff'd,
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the general rale, but seemingly exercised discretion to fashion decisions
in line with this proposal. 248 These are anomalous decisions, but they
indicate the undercurrent of judicial enthusiasm for stemming abuses of
the diversity grant.
In McSparran v. Weist 2 49 the Third Circuit overruled a line of precedent that deemed "manufactured diversity"2 50 a sufficient basis for federal court jurisdiction. The McSparran court applied a limited
retroactive effect to its holding, directing that manufactured diversity
cases filed before McSparran be dismissed, "but only where the court
finds that in the circumstances of the particular case there is ample time
and opportunity for the plaintiff to institute a new action in the state
court and that no unreasonableburden will be imposed on the plaintiff by
the dismissal of the federal action."12 5 1 Thus the McSparran court permitted continued litigation of some manufactured diversity cases.
Although this restricted retroactivity might imply that it would be unfair
for parties who had manufactured diversity based on precedent to have
their cases dismissed, the court clearly used equitable principles in fashioning its reading of the statute. Acknowledging that the "magical quality" of jurisdiction precluded contemplation of other important factors,
the court stated that these "other relevant considerations must yield to
the knowledge that it is our construction of the statute which determines
'252
in the present case whether the jurisdiction exists or is absent.
Two subsequent cases used the McSparran exception when a party
who had "manufactured" diversity jurisdiction subsequently attempted
to escape an adverse judgment by belatedly attacking the jurisdiction of
the court. 253 These decisions showed the desire of judges to grasp at equitable principles in preventing second bites. The court in Hoffman v.
818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); accord District of Columbia ex
rel. American Constr., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 797 F.2d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(exercising discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 to accept existence of diversity subsequently
challenged by defendant; leaving open potential for review).
248. Two early Supreme Court cases have been relied on in some jurisdictions for the
proposition that a court is required to hear evidence controverting jurisdiction only where the
record affirmatively shows it. If it is not in the record, it is in the discretion of the judge to
hear belated challenges to jurisdiction. Hartog v. Memory, 116 U.S. 588 (1886); Mansfield,
Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884); see also Dobbs, supra note 113, at
510.
249.
402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968).
250. "Manufactured diversity" occurs when an uninterested out-of-state citizen is named
as a guardian of a minor plaintiff or as executor or administrator of an estate to impose jurisdiction over the case on the federal courts. McSparran reinterpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (quoted
infra note 257), the statute denying federal jurisdiction and requiring dismissal in cases involving artificially or collusively created diversity jurisdiction. McSparran, 402 F.2d at 871-76.
251. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
252. Id.
253. See Hoffman v. Lenyo, 433 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1970); Law v. Converse, 297 F. Supp.
1036 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
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Lenyo 25 4 denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on a valid claim
of manufactured diversity. The defendant also sought to prevent relief in
state court by claiming the statute of limitations defense. 255 .
2 57
In Law v. Converse256 the court, contrary to statutory language
but in line with McSparran, refused to dismiss a case in which diversity
was manufactured. The Law court thought it was "clear that the overriding consideration in [McSparran] was a disposition in the interest of
justice. ' 25 8 In Law, the plaintiff had received an adverse judgment and
moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction based on plaintiff's manufactured diverse citizenship. The court found the language in McSparran
specifically referring to the protection of the "plaintiff"' 25 9 as controlling
26°
with respect to the Law defendant.
The courts in Law and Hoffman applied notions of estoppel and
waiver to subject matter jurisdiction because the McSparran court had
left that door open. The courts preferred this result, which seems beyond
argument to serve most properly notions of fair play and efficient administration of the system. The Law decision noted that "[i]t is clear that
plaintiff is attempting to have 'two bites of the apple,' "261 and the court
was not interested in either encouraging that behavior or sanctioning a
waste ofjudicial time. If these cases had been decided under the general
"whenever rule," however, the McSparran exception option would not
have been available. In such cases, the inequitable, inefficient results reward the colluding parties, as dismissal at that point would have rewarded the double-edged strategy of manufacturing diversity by utilizing
the pre-McSparranloophole, then attempting to avoid the adverse judgment based on the new rule.
254. 433 F.2d 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1970).
255. Id.
256. 297 F. Supp. 1036 (M.D. Pa. 1969).

257. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988) ("A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.").
258. Law, 297 F. Supp. at 1038.
259. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 877 (3d Cir. 1968).
260. Although not discussed in McSparran or Law, it seems that Law's application of the
McSparran rule to defendants is insupportable if the McSparran court fashioned the retroactive effect to give plaintiffs considering manufacture of diversity a chance to think again. The
only rationale that can be gleaned from these decisions is one of considered fairness. On that
basis, because the defendant would be required to "substantially retry a case he has already
tried and won," the court denied dismissal, finding that it would be "burdensome, expensive

and [a] duplication of effort on the part of the parties and the courts." Law, 297 F. Supp. at
1038. The opinion concluded that the pressure put on court calendars by these kinds of cases
was unnecessary and should be prevented when possible. "Courts, both state and federal, now
have more cases than they can handle." Id
261. Id at 1037.
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A few aberrant cases 262 have been noted by the commentators 2 63
and courts264 as "striking departure[s]" 26 5 from the rule. Although these
cases effectively have been overruled by the weight of precedent in support of the general rule, 266 they bespeak an undercurrent of judicial un'2 67
rest with the notion of parties playing "fast and loose with the courts,
also seen in the holdings in Law, Hoffman, and McSparran. In addition,
more than one court has acknowledged that it "tend[s] to agree that the
DiFrischia [refusal to grant protection to jurisdictional maneuvers subversive to fair play] is preferable to the present practice. ' 268 Although
contrary to the established impermeability of subject matter jurisdiction,
a valid assumption is that "Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of the federal courts so inflexibly that they are unable to protect
legal rights. ' 269 In a situation in which a patient and calculating defendant waits until the plaintiff's state statute of limitations has run to chal270
lenge diversity, the current rule will do just that.
262. DiFrischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960). The DiFrischia
court refused to accept the general rule and held that, because the statute of limitations had
run on the state claim, the trial court should proceed despite lack of jurisdiction. The court
held that "[a] defendant may not play fast and loose with the judicial machinery and deceive
the courts." Id. at 144; see also Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa.
1958). In Klee, the defendant waited two years after the filing of the complaint to deny diversity at a time when the plaintiff's claim effectively was barred by the state statute of limitations. The court held that it would constitute "a monstrous injustice" to allow the defendant
to escape judgment using such tactics and based its denial of defendant's motion to amend to
show lack of diversity on the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) discretionary standard for
leave to amend. The Klee court clearly would have agreed with the tenor of this Note, but was
forced into fashioning an excuse through the Rules. This attempt is seen as "plainly inconsistent with the governing Supreme Court authorities." Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 152 n.2
(1st Cir. 1976).
263. See Dobbs, supra note 113; Stephens, supra note 173.
264. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 505 (discussing DiFrischiaand Klee).
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., Rubin v. Buckman, 727 F.2d 71, 72 (3d Cir. 1984) ("DiFrischiacan no
longer be regarded as the law of this circuit."); Eisler, 535 F.2d at 152.
267. DiFrischia,279 F.2d at 144.
268. Eisler, 535 F.2d at 152.
[I]t offends both fairness and judicial economy to allow a defendant, who best knows
his own citizenship, to admit diversity jurisdiction in his answer, hamstring the process of litigation for several years by failing to cooperate during discovery, invite the
imposition of a default order, and finally raise the absence of diversity jurisdiction
after the default order was entered ....
[Nonetheless, t]he well established rule in
the federal courts is that subject matter jurisdiction may be litigated at any time
before the case is finally decided.
Id. at 151; see also Rubin, 727 F.2d at 72 (court was sympathetic to argument that plaintiff
should be estopped from contravening his prior allegation of diversity in an effort to avoid an
unfavorable summary judgment ruling; but under DiFrischia,held that there was no estoppel).
269. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978). The Owen Court
nevertheless held that the diversity requirement is superior to this assumption.
270. See, e.g., Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958). See supra
note 262,
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Conclusion
This Note introduces a new approach for dealing with strategic delays in assertions of diversity jurisdiction. Parties asserting fraudulent
and misleading existence of, or parties failing to acknowledge the lack of,
diversity of citizenship, should be estopped from attacking diversity jurisdiction. Recommendations for equitable resolution of belated attacks on
diversity jurisdiction have been posited before27 1 and subsequently have
been denounced by commentators 272 and rejected by the courts.2 73 This
Note's proposal does indeed "controvert deep-rooted assumptions." 274
In an age when considerations of efficiency and economy are of utmost
importance, however, perhaps it is time for another look. Holmes' famous observation still is apt:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
275 since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
The thirty years since DiFrischia v. New York Central R.R. addressed this issue276 have seen massive increases in the numbers of cases
filed both in state and federal courts.2 77 The attempts at the abolition of
diversity jurisdiction have failed. 278 Neither the state legislatures nor the
state courts are concerned about greedy federal courts consuming cases
between nondiverse parties279 and subsequently robbing the state courts
of their independent powers. Today's concern is making litigation more
effective and more productive while preserving the ultimate goal: the just
271. See supra notes 253-61 and accompanying text; see also Dobbs, supra note 113.
272. See, eg., Note, PleadingLack of Jurisdictionas a Defense in FederalCourts, 38 NEB.
L. REV.1058, 1062 (1959) (authored by Donald Leonard) (discussing Klee); Case Note, Federal Procedure-JurisdictionConferred by Stipulation, 15 U. MIAMI L. REv. 315, 318 (1961)
(authored by John White) (discussing DiFrischia); Case Note, Federal Court Allowance of
Tardy Disproofof Diversity Held to Be Abuse of Discretion, 7 UTAH L. REv.258, 261 (1960)
(discussing Klee and DiFrischia).
273. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978); Gilbert v.
David, 235 U.S. 561, 568 (1915).
274. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 529.
275. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897); see also Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 (1980) ("[W]e cannot escape the reality that the law on
occasion adheres to doctrinal concepts long after the reasons which gave them birth have
disappeared and after experience suggests the need for change.") (rejecting the marital
privilege).
276. 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960) (refusing to let defendants "play fast and loose with
the courts" by utilizing Rule 12(h)(3) in attacking jurisdiction one day before plaintiff's state.
statute of limitations had run); see also Dobbs, supra note 113.
277. See supra note 69.
278. The proposed bills before the House and the Senate in 1977-78 were defeated. Aside
from the recent revisions, other efforts to restrict diversity never have left committee in the
Senate. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 94, § 2.5, at 27 n.19.
279. See J. MOORE, supra note 9, 0.60[4].
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decision of controversies. 280 There is no hidden constitutional problem
with the proposal. The only concern raised is that of the appropriate,
practical, and productive workings of the system of justice in the
courts. 28 1 The rules of procedure and jurisdiction should be safeguarded
not by artificial notions but by "practical reasons of trial convenience,
'282
fairness, and judicial economy.
The system needs to be changed, not patched, by providing remedies
for the abuses of crafty litigants. Traditional sanctions are not the answer when parties take advantage of the ritualistic rules regarding diversity jurisdiction. This Note prescribes different and more appropriate
sanctions for abuse of the legal system. The penalty for disobedience in
following rules of fair play is estoppel, binding litigants to a court's jurisdiction. 283 Other forms of sanction, for example fines or more severe
restriction of a litigant's rights, are inconsistent with the essence of this
Note and will promote additional problems, rather than solve the ones at
hand.
Diversity jurisdiction presumably is here to stay. In its current form
it is exercised by litigants as a right of individual citizens, not as a shield
against the ogre of federal power. The courts must develop ways of dealing with the dilemmas of diversity, rather than continuing practices that
strain the concept of justice. Any concept of "justice" or "just conduct"
includes fairness and equity. 28 4 Law and equity have merged. Unfair
laws of procedure should be addressed to prevent mistrust of a system
allegedly supporting "justice" while allowing inequitable conduct within
its canons. It is a blow to ethical and economical considerations to provide procedures that favor duplicitous litigants who may be dissatisfied
with adverse results. Many courts find that "[n]evertheless, the law regarding subject matter jurisdiction is clear. ' 28 5 Actually, the law and the
procedural rules developed over history are neither clear nor mandated.
The case law may be clear, but it follows an outdated line of thinking that
ignores bad faith tactics. The case law misconstrues concrete constitutional mandates in the jurisdictional sections that actually are flexible
and leave room for changes. No sound rationale explains why Rule
280.

Dobbs, supra note 113, at 521.

281.

Id.

282. Baker, supra note 100, at 783.
283. This use of sanctioning powers has been precluded by recent Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n.21 (1978) ("asserted inequity" irrelevant in court's mandate to follow jurisdictional rules).
284. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 775-76
(unabr. ed. 1970).
285. E.g., Lackawanna Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 86
F.R.D. 330, 332 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
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12(h)(3) should not be reformed equitably, because its precept is based in
28 6
case law and is not a constitutional minimum.
Continued adherence to the ancient credo that subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship may be challenged at any time
28 7
fosters distrust and abuse of a system not living up to its principles.
Second bites at the apple as a cunning litigation tactic do not fit in a
system based in ethics as well as law. A simple solution is presented by
this Note's proposal, which would promote a more efficient functioning
of the courts, eliminate a large number of disputes over diversity, and put
all litigants on equal grounds concerning the rules of jurisdiction. If the
proposal is instituted, in most cases the first bite at the apple of jurisdiction would be the right one and the last one.

286. Dobbs, supra note 113, at 524.
287. Id. (the present doctrine "leads-quite understandably-to public contempt for the
law that a democratic society cannot afford"); see also J. MOORE, supra note 9, 0.60[4]
(doctrine does "not increase respect for judicial administration").

